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Abstract Theoretical and empirical body of research have exposed the powerful role of experiencing
regret in guiding choice behavior. In this paper, we examined the impact of experienced regret and
rejoicing induced by feedback provided on a risk decision prior to a two-period intertemporal choice.
To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst attempt to bring together experienced regret and choice over time.
We used the two-component discounted utility model approach as a framework. We applied previous
research ￿ndings on the e￿ect of experienced regret on utility, and we performed an experiment to
test whether experienced regret and rejoicing have an impact on the discount factor. We found that
both experienced regret and rejoicing have an impact on the way people discount future: when regret
is experienced the discount factor decreases, whereas when rejoicing is experienced the discount factor
increases.
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1 Introduction
Most of the decisions we make entail consequences that extend across time: we make trade o￿s between
costs and bene￿ts that occur at di￿erent points in time (i.e, intertemporal choices). The consequences
of these decisions (e.g., education, marriage, health-relevant behavior, savings, investments, etc.),
often have important rami￿cations to our life, therefore we believe that it is important to better
understand what factors exert in￿uence on intertemporal decision making. Loewenstein (1996, 1999,
2000) argued that negative emotions play an important role in intertemporal choice1. In this paper,
we focus on experienced regret as a negative emotion.
Regret is a common everyday experienced negative emotion after making a wrong choice. We
experience regret when we discover that an outcome would have been better if only we had chosen
di￿erently. Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) integrated experiencing regret into a decision
theory called regret theory. Regret theory quanti￿es experienced regret by the unfavorable di￿erence
between the obtained outcome and the outcome that would have been obtained and when the di￿er-
ence is favorable then the positive emotion rejoicing is experienced. Therefore, to experience regret
one should receive feedback both on the chosen and on a foregone alternative (complete feedback). If
there is feedback only on the chosen alternative (partial feedback), no regret can be experienced. Re-
gret has attracted much attention in research on individual decision making over the past few decades
due to its serious day-to-day behavioral implications (for review, see Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007)).
Here, our goal is to examine whether experienced regret has an impact on subsequent intertemporal
choice. To our knowledge, in this paper, we make the ￿rst attempt to interconnect the ￿ndings on
experienced regret with intertemporal choice.
The analysis of intertemporal choice, in economics and other social sciences has been normatively
dominated by the discounted utility model (Samuelson, 1937; Koopmans, 1960). The common percep-
tion that a present outcome is worth more than a deferred one delineates the construct of discounted
utility model. The model has two underlying components. The ￿rst component is the instantaneous
utility. This is the present utility2 of the option at hand, which is assumed to be stable over time.
The second component is the discount function. This is a function of time delay (how far the out-
comes of the option are removed from the present), which is assumed to be independent from the
instantaneous utility. One can express the utility of an option whose consequences are intertemporal
simply by multiplying the instantaneous utility associated to it by the discount function.
Over the last three decades, a large body of empirical research on intertemporal choice, in psy-
chology and behavioral economics has documented various inadequacies in the assumptions about
the properties of these two components. Many alternative models have emerged introducing modi-
￿cations to the discounted utility model, while still maintaining the two-component construct (see
1 More precisely, Loewenstein (1996, 1999, 2000) argued that a wide range of negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear),
drive states (e.g., hunger, thirst, and sexual desire) and feelings states (e.g., pain) in￿uence intertemporal choice.
2 Utility of an option is a numerical value that refers to the satisfaction, or decision-maker’s preferences, however
derived. Options with higher utilities are preferred over options with lower utility.3
Frederick et al (2002) for an extended overview). We use the two-component discounted utility model
approach as a framework to examine the role of experienced regret on intertemporal choice.
As a ￿rst step, we outline the ￿ndings from previous research on the in￿uence of experienced
regret on post-choice utility evaluation. We extend these ￿ndings to the context of intertemporal
choice by applying them to the instantaneous utility evaluation. Next, in an experimental study, we
examine the role of experienced regret on the second component of the discounted utility model. In
the experiment, we induce the emotion of regret by providing feedback on risk decision prior to a
two-period intertemporal choice. We present and interpret the results through a qualitative analysis,
which suggests that the time discount function is in￿uenced as well by the regret experienced prior
to making the intertemporal choice and that this in￿uence is in the same direction as it is for the
instantaneous utility.
2 The Role of Experienced Regret on Utility
Regret theory assumes that experienced regret leads to reducing the psychological experience of
satisfaction from the obtained outcome (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982). Several empirical
studies have provided support to this assumption. In Inman et al (1997) participants were asked
to make choices between lottery pairs. After making their choices, the participants were provided
with outcome feedback on the chosen lottery as well as on the foregone lottery and their subjective
evaluation of the choices were assessed. The analysis of the results revealed that the information about
the forgone alternative had a signi￿cant in￿uence on the participants’ evaluation of their choices.
Regret feedback resulted in a decrease, and rejoicing feedback in an increase, of the satisfaction level.
Similar results were reported in Mellers et al (1999, Experiment 1). In this study, participants were
presented with series of choices between two gambles. Participants always learned the outcome of the
chosen gamble. In some of the trials, they also observed the outcome of the foregone gamble. After
each choice, their subjective emotion evaluation of the choice was assessed. The results revealed that
the availability of feedback on the foregone alternative had signi￿cant e￿ect on how participants felt
about the outcome of the chosen gamble. Participants felt better for their own outcome when the
outcome of the other gamble was worse, and they felt worse for their own outcome when the other
gamble resulted in a better outcome.
Inspired by the experimental paradigm used in Mellers et al (1999), Camille et al (2004) provided
con￿rmation of the subjective emotion evaluation ratings of the outcomes with the physiological index
of emotional reactivity collected using skin conductance response (SCR). The authors compared the
emotional reactions of normal participants with the emotional reactions of patients with orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) lesions. The authors found that the SCR was enhanced in normal participants while
viewing both the outcome of the chosen gamble and outcome of the foregone gamble compared to
viewing only the outcome of the chosen gamble. By contrast, the SCR in the patients were not mod-
ulated by the outcome of the foregone alternative. These results suggested the speci￿city of the OFC4
in mediating regret. Previous neuroimaging studies have implicated that the OFC plays an important
role in reward processing (coding stimulus value) from variety of sensory modalities (for a review, see
O’Doherty, 2004). Coricelli et al (2005) were the ￿rst to provide neuroimaging evidences of the role of
OFC in experiencing of regret. The authors measured brain activity using functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) while participants were presented with a series of choices between two gambles.
The results showed that the neural activity in response to experiencing regret is distinct from the
activity detected during only the chosen outcome evaluation. The authors found that the activity in
medial OFC was correlated with the degree of regret (i.e., the di￿erence between the chosen outcome
and the foregone outcome): greater activity for the negative outcomes and greater deactivation for
the positive outcomes when feedback on the foregone gamble was provided. In addition to the activ-
ity in the OFC, the authors found similar response in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior
hippocampus. These areas discriminated between better and worse outcome on the foregone gamble.
These ￿ndings suggested that when experiencing regret there are distinctive neural substrates in-
volved in the reward processing (Coricelli et al, 2007). The ￿ndings reported in the studies described
above provide strong psychological, physiological and neurophysiological evidences of the in￿uence of
experienced regret on utility evaluation.
In this paper, we apply these ￿ndings to the study of the role of experienced regret on intertempo-
ral choice. We ￿rst outline the model of the impact of experienced regret to the instantaneous utility
evaluation. In the aforementioned studies, the e￿ect of regret on utility is evaluated immediately after
the decisions are made. Under the discounted utility framework, we interpret these results as obser-
vations about the instantaneous utility of an outcome. In this study, we induce regret and rejoicing
prior to making an intertemporal choice. We assume that this emotion manipulation produces the
same e￿ect on instantaneous utility as the one observed by assessing post-choice level of satisfaction.
That is, we follow the model of Inman et al (1997)3 for regret e￿ects on post-choice valuation, and
we assume that the instantaneous utility uE(x) depends on emotion E as
uE(x) = uP(x) + rE; (1)
where uP(:) is a monotonically increasing value function, x is the outcome from the chosen option,
rE is an o￿set depending on whether regret or rejoicing was experienced prior to the intertemporal
decision. The o￿set due to the discrepancy between the obtained outcome and the outcome that could
have been obtained had an alternative option been chosen: rE is negative when regret is experienced,
and positive when rejoicing is experienced. The o￿set is created at the time when the payo￿s are
revealed. The subscript E, discriminating the role of the experienced emotion, can be R for regret or
J for rejoicing. We set the no emotion situation corresponding to partial feedback as a reference. The
instantaneous utility at partial feedback is denoted as uP(x). Extending the equation with allowing
E to take the value P, we include the partial feedback condition as an identity (due to rP = 0).
3 This model itself is motivated by the regret theory model of Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982).5
While we have a formulation for the e￿ect of experienced regret on the instantaneous utility, we
are not aware of any results concerning the other component of the discounted utility model, the
discount function. In this paper, we present our experiment designed to bring insight into whether
experienced regret has an e￿ect on the discount function. In our study we use a choice between two
outcomes that can occur respectively at two di￿erent points in time, i.e., two-period intertemporal
choice. Note that this type of intertemporal choice does not allow for capturing the shape of the
discount function, as the discount function is e￿ectively reduced to a single discount factor. As our
main goal is to measure how emotions in￿uence the way people relate to future, and not to measure
how discounting depends on the size of the time delay, such a two-period intertemporal choice is
su￿cient for us.
3 The Experiment
We conducted an experiment combining the experimental paradigm used in Coricelli et al (2005)
with a two-period intertemporal choice. We presented participants with a sequence of trials involving
making two di￿erent decisions. The ￿rst decision was between two risky gambles with equivalent
probabilities associated to the outcomes. Both gambles had zero expected payo￿s. The di￿erence
between the gambles was the size of the monetary gain or loss. On this decision, two di￿erent types
of feedback were provided. In the partial feedback condition, only the outcome of the chosen gamble
was shown, whereas in the complete feedback condition, the outcomes of both gambles were revealed.
The second decision was the two-period intertemporal choice. On this second decision no feedback
was provided. We tested whether the type of feedback on the risky gambles a￿ects the way people
make the trade o￿ between the two periods. We hypothesized that emotions triggered in the ￿rst
decision would in￿uence the decision processes about the future in the second.
In this paper, we make the distinction between experienced decision-related and -unrelated regret.
Previous empirical studies have demonstrated that experienced regret exert in￿uence on subsequent
choice (for review, see Zeelenberg et al (2001)). This in￿uence has been shown for repeating decision
in the same domain. We call this decision-related experienced regret, i.e., previously experienced
regret in a certain decision domain is taken into account when making subsequent decisions in the
same domain. In our experiment we apply a novel approach to the study of the consequences of
experienced regret by introducing the decision-unrelated regret, i.e., regret is experienced on a choice
prior to making a subsequent choice in a di￿erent domain. In the context of making two di￿erent
decisions after each other, decision-unrelated regret can be treated as an incidental emotion. Although
regret is experienced at the moment of making a decision, it arises from sources objectively unrelated
to the decision at hand (cf. Rick and Loewenstein (2006)). Following the appraisal-tendency theory
assumptions4 (Lerner and Keltner, 2000), we assume that decision-unrelated experienced regret,
although provoked in one decision situation, is carried over to the next decision.
4 Lerner and her colleagues (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Han et al, 2007) have provided
a framework to study the underlying appraisal patterns of incidental emotions. According to the Appraisal-Tendency
Framework decision-unrelated emotional appraisals, which although provoked in a prior situation, are carried on beyond
the eliciting situation by coloring the content as well as the process of people’s thoughts.6
Fig. 1 The regret gambling task analogous to the one used in Coricelli et al (2005). The colored sectors on both
wheels represent the probability associated with the monetary gain (blue) and loss (red). A green square highlights the
selected wheel. (a) represents the partial feedback condition where feedback was provided only on the selected wheel
(the stopping position of the arrow (in yellow) indicates the obtained outcome). (b) represents the complete feedback
condition where the outcomes on both wheels were revealed.
Method
3.1 Experimental Procedure and Design
In the beginning of the experiment, each participant was seated in front of a computer screen and
presented with instructions written on paper. An experimenter and one assistant were running the
experiment. Before starting the experiment, there was a training session consisting of six trials iden-
tical to the experimental trials. The experiment lasted 45 minutes. There were short breaks every 15
minutes. All responses were given anonymously.
A within-subjects experimental design with one factor was used to test whether experienced
regret on a prior choice in￿uences the discounting decision processes. The independent variable was
the type of feedback provided on the ￿rst decision: partial feedback and complete feedback. The
complete feedback was subdivided into regret and rejoicing feedback. Participants were not informed
in advance what type of feedback they will receive. The dependent variable was the mean indi￿erence
value (to be discussed in more detail later in this Section).
In the beginning of each trial, participants view two gambles, depicted as two wheels of fortune
(Fig. 1). In the experiment all numbers corresponded to payo￿s in real money (in Euro5). One of
the wheels had win 2 on the left and loss 2 on the right side. This was the lower risk wheel. The
other wheel had win 5 on the left and loss 5 on the right side. This was the higher risk wheel.
These two wheels were used throughout the experiment. The position of the wheels on the screen
was counterbalanced in a random order (i.e., half of the trials one of the wheels was on the left side
of the screen and the other half on the right side).
In each gamble, the relative size of the colored sectors of the wheel represented the probability
associated with the monetary gain (blue) and loss (red). During the experiment the depicted proba-
5 At this time, the Euro (e) is the currency used in 16 of the 27 member states of the European Union.7
bility level on both wheels was kept constant (50/50). The depicted and the actual probabilities were
the same for obtaining gains or losses for both types of feedback provided.
Participants indicated their choice by left or right mouse press. The elapsed time between the
wheels’ appearance on the screen and the button press was recorded. Once selected, the chosen
gamble was highlighted on the screen by a green square. Depending on the type of condition, an
arrow appeared in the center either in the selected wheel only or in both wheels. In partial feedback,
the arrow appeared always only in the chosen wheel. In complete feedback condition, the arrow
appeared randomly in half of the trials ￿rst in the chosen wheel and in the other half of the trials ￿rst
in the unchosen wheel. Each arrow rotated within the wheel for an interval of time randomly selected
between 1s and 5s with 0.5s steps and then stopped. Immediately after the ￿rst arrow stopped, the
second arrow started rotating. The stopping position of the arrow in the chosen wheel indicated the
obtained amount of money in the ￿rst choice.
Prior to each trial, participants were informed that they had 10 Euro as initial amount to start
with on a trial. The amount of money participants obtained from the selected wheel was accordingly
subtracted or added to this initial 10 Euro. This gave the total amount in this trial that could be
paid for the participation in the experiment. After each trial the obtained total amount was recorded.
By default, this total amount was payable two months after the experiment.
Before conducting the experiment, we performed a pilot study to determine the length of time
delay to be used in the experiment. 30 students from University of Trento participated in an identical
experimental procedure. We tested independently three time delays: one-week, two-week and two-
month. We found that the participants preferred tomorrow over the two-month delay 62% of the times
on average, whereas in one-week and two-week delays, participants preferred tomorrow only 19% of
the times on average. On the basis of these data, we selected the two-month time delay to measure
how emotions in￿uence the way people relate to tomorrow. This time delay allows for displaying an
increase or a decrease of the time preferences due to the emotion manipulation, while in the other
cases the preference towards the delayed payment was too strong, thus it would be di￿cult to induce
variation due to the emotion manipulation.
After each round on the wheels, participants made a second decision. They had to decide whether
to keep the total amount and receive it after two months or to exchange it for a smaller amount, but
to receive it one day after the experiment. We used one day after the experiment instead of today
to avoid the strong preference towards the present (today) and to have equivalent cost for obtaining
the rewards in both periods.
In order to obtain their time preferences, participants were asked the following question:
You will be paid x e in 2 months.
Would you rather accept qx e tomorrow?
We de￿ne this decision situation in the following mathematical form:
uE(qx) R dEuE(x); (2)8
where q is a number smaller than unity, uE(x) is the instantaneous utility of receiving x Euro under
experienced emotion in the experimental condition E and dE is the discount factor under the emotion
condition. The meaning of the number q is the proportion to which the amount to be received after
two months is reduced if it was to be obtained after one day.
To give their answer, participants had to wait for "yes" and "no" to appear on either left or right
side of the screen, which was counterbalanced in a random order. By left or right mouse press, their
choice was highlighted by green square. The elapsed time between the presentation of the "yes" and
"no" and the subsequent button press was recorded.
3.2 Eliciting the Indi￿erence Value
We asked our participants to make choices between receiving a larger reward x two months after the
experiment and a smaller reward qx one day after the experiment. In the literature on intertemporal
choice, when the choice is between outcomes only in two periods, the norm is to assume under-
weighting the utility of the outcome that is delayed further in time (Frederick et al, 2002). Therefore,
we took implicitly our two-period sequence to be declining with the increasing of the time delay (i.e.,
the utility of an amount received after two months is lower than the utility of the same amount
received tomorrow due to the larger time delay).
In the experiment, our goal was to elicit the participants’ preferences between the two time delays
and to evaluate whether their preferences for the time delays were altered by the regret and rejoicing
experienced prior to the intertemporal decision. We elicited the participants’ preferences through
extracting their (mean) indi￿erence value. For a general two choice options decision that depends on
one parameter, the indi￿erence value is the value of the parameter at which the two choice options
are of equal subjective value to the individual. In our two-period intertemporal choice, ￿nding the
indi￿erence value means ￿nding how much the amount to be received after one day should be in order
to make the participants indi￿erent between the two time periods. That is, in this decision situation
the parameter is the proportionality factor q and its indi￿erence value q
(E)
0 , such that the amount
receivable after two months and the amount receivable after one day are of equal subjective value. In
terms of the decision relation Eq. (2)
uE(q
(E)
0 x) = dEuE(x): (3)
Note that, although at a certain moment and for a certain x a participant has a well de￿ned q0,
q0 can take a di￿erent value at a di￿erent moment or for a di￿erent x. We assume that for a given
individual the indi￿erence value q0 ￿uctuates around a mean indi￿erence value ¹ q0, which we use
as our dependent variable to characterize the individual’s time preferences. To extract this mean
indi￿erence value we will have to adopt a statistical approach for each participant (preceding the
usual statistical processing of the group data). Note also that in the context of intertemporal choice
the indi￿erence value de￿ned in this way is a measurable quantity, in contrast to the discount factor9
and the instantaneous utility, which are not accessible separately experimentally. While generally ¹ q
(E)
0
can be only used to observe how the combination of these quantities behave, with the model Eq. (1)
for the emotion dependence of the instantaneous utility at hand, from the emotion dependence of
¹ q0
(E) insights can be gained about the emotion dependence of the discount factor (see the Discussion).
To estimate ¹ q
(E)
0 we used four values q = .6, .7, .8, and .9. Each of these values was asked
per condition, which formed 12 questions. Each of these questions was repeated eight times during
the experiment in order to average out the inconsistency (due to aforementioned ￿uctuation) in
participants’ answer.
We now brie￿y discuss how ¹ q
(E)
0 was obtained. We asked our question n times for a given q value,
for a given condition. We use here n instead of eight, because the number of times a questions is
asked varies due to the of outliers removal: for each subject, outlying responses with respect to the
reaction times were excluded6.
We interpreted the answers probabilistically: if for a given q value in a given condition, the num-
ber of acceptances of a participant was Y
(E)
q , we obtained the probabilities P(q
(E)
0 < q) = Y
(E)
q =n.
The quantity F(q) = P(q
(E)
0 < q) is the cumulative probability distribution of q
(E)
0 , from which the
average, ¹ q0
(E), for the participant for the given condition can be taken straightforwardly. The proba-
bilistic interpretation was the key ingredient in handling the possible choosing at random: it provided
means for treating situations when from the eight questions for a condition a given q value was ac-
cepted some times and rejected some other times. This inconsistency was handled using the criterion
of increasing F(q), participants with non-increasing F(q) were disregarded; these participants formed
the group with inconsistent time preferences, see the next subsection. For example, a participant with
non-increasing F(q) would accept an o￿er with q = 0:6 more likely than one with q = 0:8, which
seems unreasonable. This could be interpreted as the participant is having q
(E)
0 ￿uctuating too much
for its average to be measured by only eight repetitions of a question per each condition.
3.3 Participants
The participants were recruited through bulletin board advertising. 57 students at University of
Trento participated in the experiment. We had both male and female participants, in roughly equal
proportions. Participants were paid for their participation. The amount they received was automat-
ically selected by the software based on the choices made during the experiment, i.e., at the end of
the experiment the reward obtained in one of the trials was selected at random. Participants were
asked to return for the payment on the date indicated in the chosen trial - after one day or after two
months, from the date of the experiment. All payments were made in cash and strictly only on the
speci￿ed date.
After the data collection was completed, participants’ preferences were categorized in three groups
based on the type of choices they made. In the context of our experiment, there were strict, non-strict
6 For the purpose of outliers removal, we excluded all responses with +/- 2.00 SD above the mean. We consider these
trials as misreported.10
and inconsistent time preferences. In the strict time preferences group were included 10 participants
exhibiting a strong preference towards one of the two available periods (they chose tomorrow or
two months on every trial). The participants in the strong time preference group did not display
sensitivity to our emotional manipulation. In the inconsistent time preferences group were included
another 10 participants, who did not reveal consistent time preferences (as in the example discussed
above, these participants were more likely to accept q = :6 while tending to reject q = :9). The data
from the participants in the inconsistent group were excluded from the indi￿erence values estimation.
3.4 Emotion Induction
Regret and rejoicing rise from the discrepancy between actual outcome and the foregone outcome,
i.e., when the value of the foregone outcome is higher than the obtained outcome regret is experi-
enced, whereas when the obtained outcome is higher than the foregone one rejoicing is experienced
(see Tab. 1. In the experiment, the emotional manipulation was attested by the di￿erence between
the outcome of the selected wheel and the outcome of the unselected one. This di￿erence is possible
to be measured only in the complete feedback condition. The emotion induction in the experiment
was counterbalanced in complete feedback.
Emotion Total Payo￿s Total Emotion
R 12 (2, 5) 15 J
J 12 (2, -5) 5 R
R 8 (-2, 5) 15 J
J 8 (-2, -5) 5 R
Table 1 Emotion induction cases. The middle column refers to the combination of outcomes, paired in the form (a,
b). The left side of the table refers to a as chosen and to b as unchosen, whereas the right side refers to b as chosen and
a as unchosen.
3.5 Results
To test whether the decision-unrelated regret and rejoicing have an e￿ect on the intertemporal choice
in a statistically important way, a repeated measure ANOVA was performed. The results revealed
a signi￿cant main e￿ect of the manipulated emotions (F(1:27;58:28) = 7:89, p < :05). The type of
feedback provided on the gamble had a substantial in￿uence on the subsequent intertemporal choice.
Compared with partial feedback, complete feedback modi￿ed in a considerable way how people make
trade o￿s between the two time periods (Fig. 2).
Furthermore, in a pairwise statistical comparison (with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple com-
parisons), the analysis indicated the relevance of the type of complete feedback. The mean indi￿erence
value obtained in the partial feedback (M = :62, SD = :19) was statistically di￿erent (p < :05) from
the mean indi￿erence value obtained in the regret condition (M = :59, SD = :19) as well as it was
from the mean indi￿erence value obtained in the rejoicing condition (M = :64, SD = :19) (see Fig.












































Fig. 2 Estimated mean indi￿erence value per condition. (Error bar: 95% con￿dence interval) The solid line connects
the mean indi￿erence value for the partial feedback and the regret condition, the dashed line connects the mean

































Fig. 3 Estimated mean changes for regret (solid line) and rejoicing (dashed line) conditions, based on a pairwise
statistical comparison to the partial feedback condition (zero line). The error bars are the 95% con￿dence intervals for
the mean di￿erences.
feedback condition (p < :05). We found that regret and rejoicing displayed distinct directions of
in￿uences when induced prior to an intertemporal decision, compared to situation when no counter-
factual comparison between obtained and foregone outcome can be made (partial feedback): when
regret is experienced the indi￿erence value decreases, when rejoicing is experienced the indi￿erence
value increases.
In addition, to check whether the di￿erent risk level associated to the two gambles used in the
experiment a￿ected choice behavior, a statistical analysis of the proportion of choices of low and
high risk gambles was performed. We found that the proportion of high risk gambles did not show
signi￿cant di￿erences for di￿erent conditions, in fact, the proportions of risky gamble choices were12
almost identical. This result helped us to rule out the possible interference of the risk level with the
observed e￿ect.
3.6 Discussion
The results showed that when making trade-o￿s between two time periods, participants were in-
￿uenced by the emotions triggered by the type of feedback on a prior choice. When participants
experienced regret they were willing to accept on average more o￿ers to exchange a larger-later re-
ward with a smaller-sooner reward, whereas when presented with rejoicing they were willing to reject
on average more of these o￿ers, both compared to the partial feedback condition (which served as
a baseline since neither regret nor rejoicing were introduced). This e￿ect supported our emotional-
carryover hypothesis. We found evidence that decision-unrelated regret, although evoked by the prior
irrelevant decision situation, applied di￿erent color lenses to the judging of the subsequent decision.
It is still left to examine whether the observed e￿ect of experienced regret and rejoicing on subse-
quent intertemporal choice imply e￿ect on the discount factor, or the e￿ect can be attributed to the
impact on the instantaneous utility (see Eq. (1)). To this end, let us ￿rst assume that the discount
factor does not depend on the emotions, i.e., dE = d for all conditions. Let q
(P)
0 denote the indi￿erence
value of q in the absence of emotions (partial feedback),
uP(q
(P)
0 x) = duP(x): (4)
As we show below, if d does not depend on emotions, the emotion dependence of the instantaneous
utility results in an increase of the indi￿erence value for regret, and a decrease for rejoicing compared
to its value in the partial feedback case. Indeed, substituting the regret theory model (1) in the
decision situation (2) we have
uP(q
(P)
0 x) + rE R d(uP(x) + rE) (5)
which amounts to (because of Eq. (4))
rE R drE: (6)
For regret, we have rR < drR and for rejoicing rJ > drJ, because 0 < d < 1. This means that the
indi￿erence value q
(P)









0 ). This clearly con￿icts our behavioral results. We found
that the indi￿erence value depends on decision-unrelated emotions in the opposite way: when regret
is experienced the indi￿erent value decreases and when rejoicing is experienced the indi￿erence value
increases.
The discrepancy between the above qualitative result and the behavioral responses tells us that
assuming an emotion independent discount factor would be incorrect. If we want a qualitative model
that describes the emotion dependence of q
(E)
0 observed in the experiment, we should use a discount
factor that decreases for regret and increases for rejoicing. To illustrate this point, we depicted the13
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Fig. 4 Graphical representation of the decision situation. Solid lines: Partial feedback. Dashed lines: Regret condition,
assuming emotion independent discount factor. Dashed-dotted line: the utility of the two month option for the regret
condition, including the emotion dependence of the discount factor.
ingredients of the above qualitative reasoning graphically in Fig. 4. The solid lines represent the
decision situation for partial feedback, with the monotonically increasing line being the utility of
the option payable tomorrow as a function of the parameter q. The horizontal line is the utility of
the option payable after two months. (Both utilities are represented for a ￿xed value of x.) The
intersection of the two lines gives the indi￿erence value q
(P)
0 . The dashed lines are the analogous
functions for the case of regret, assuming an emotion independent discount factor. The key point
here is that the curve for the utility of the amount to be received tomorrow is shifted down with rR,
while the constant utility of the amount to be received after two months is shifted with a smaller




0 on the ￿gure. The dashed dotted line represents the utility of the option payable in two
months for regret condition, if it is assumed that the discount factor decreases due to regret (resulting




0 , this decrease
should be large enough to result in a total decrease (compared to the partial feedback case) of the
utility of the option payable in two months that is larger than rR. If the total decrease was precisely
rR, the constant utility line would be shifted down exactly as much as the line of the utility of the
amount to be received tomorrow. The two curves would thus be shifted down without a change in
their relative position, resulting in no change in q0. A similar reasoning can be carried out for the
case of rejoicing. To summarize, from our experiment we can conclude that decision-unrelated regret
decreases, rejoicing increases the discount factor. This is our main result. This result con￿rms that
intertemporal decision process can be in￿uenced by factors unrelated to the decision task.
One possible explanation of this emotional carryover e￿ect on the discount factor could be that
experienced regret triggered more pessimistic thoughts about the future: overestimating the impact of
negative forces in the future, which made the smaller-sooner option more attractive. On the opposite14
side, experienced rejoicing triggered more optimistic thoughts: underestimating the role of future
uncontrollable events due to the positive experience. Rejoicing acted as pink-colored glasses a￿ecting
participants’ ability to judge. It is worthwhile to note, that the results from our behavioral study
suggest that experienced decision-unrelated regret a￿ects the discount factor in the same direction
as it a￿ects the instantaneous utility.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we brought together experienced regret and intertemporal choice. Regret and rejoicing
are emotions based on juxtaposing the outcome of the choice we made with the outcome of the
rejected alternative. We studied the impact of regret and rejoicing induced by the feedback on a risk
decision prior to a two-period intertemporal choice. Previous research ￿ndings on regret have shown
that experienced regret leads to decrease in the utility of the obtained outcome. We applied these
￿ndings to the instantaneous utility. We conducted an experiment to test whether experienced regret
has also in￿uence on the discount factor. We found that when regret is experienced the discount
factor decreases, when rejoicing is experienced the discount factor increases. These results indicated
that the discounting decision process is in￿uenced by regret experienced on a prior di￿erent choice.
We found that this in￿uence is in the same direction as the one for the instantaneous utility. Our
results led us to conclude that experienced regret evoked in one decision situation is carried over to a
subsequent intertemporal choice. We interpret these results as suggesting that, apart from reducing
the utility, experienced regret is a￿ecting the ability to judge by eliciting more pessimistic believes
about the future. We hope that our empirical ￿ndings will foster the creation of new interface between
emotions and intertemporal choice by taking special consideration of the regret e￿ects, which may
lead to more informed and improved formal assumptions about intertemporal decision making.
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